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Sustainability science has grown as a field of inquiry, but has said
little about the role of large-scale private sector actors in socio-
ecological systems change. However, the shaping of global trends
and transitions depends greatly on the private sector and its
development impact. Market-based and command-and-control
policy instruments have, along with corporate citizenship, been
the predominant means for bringing sustainable development
priorities into private sector decision-making. This research iden-
tifies conflict as a further means throughwhich environmental and
social risks are translated into business costs and decision making.
Through in-depth interviews with finance, legal, and sustainability
professionals in the extractive industries, and empirical case
analysis of 50 projects worldwide, this research reports on the
financial value at stake when conflict erupts with local communi-
ties. Over the past decade, high commodity prices have fueled the
expansion of mining and hydrocarbon extraction. These develop-
ments profoundly transform environments, communities, and econ-
omies, and frequently generate social conflict. Our analysis shows
that mining and hydrocarbon companies fail to factor in the full scale
of the costs of conflict. For example, as a result of conflict, a major,
world-class mining project with capital expenditure of between US$3
and US$5 billion was reported to suffer roughly US$20 million per
week of delayed production in net present value terms. Clear analysis
of the costs of conflict provides sustainability professionals with
a strengthened basis to influence corporate decision making, partic-
ularly when linked to corporate values. Perverse outcomes of over-
emphasizing a cost analysis are also discussed.
regulation
Large-scale natural resource extraction projects (includingexploration and processing activities) profoundly transform
environments, communities, and economies, and often generate
social conflict (2, 3). Previous studies of resource extraction and
conflict have highlighted the relationship between mining and
hydrocarbon resources and broader civil conflict (4, 5) and in-
dividual cases of project level conflict (6, 7). In this study, we
investigate the importance of company–community conflict in
the context of regulation of the sustainability performance of
mining and hydrocarbon companies. We estimate the cost of
social conflict to companies, determine how companies interpret
this conflict, and explain how they respond to conflict. Costs were
understood broadly as the negative impacts of company–community
conflict on a company’s tangible and intangible assets, including
value erosion. Conflict is defined as the coexistence of aspirations,
interests, and world views that cannot be met simultaneously, or
that actors do not perceive as being subject to simultaneous satis-
faction, and is viewed in this assessment as ranging from low-level
tension to escalated situations involving a complete relationship
breakdown or violence (8).
There is growing appreciation that unmitigated environmental
and social risks have the potential to negatively influence the
financial success of large-scale developments in the extractive
industries. A 2008 study of 190 projects operated by the major
international oil companies showed that the time taken for
projects to come on-line nearly doubled in the preceding decade,
causing significant increases in costs (9), although this increase
reflects project remoteness, scale, technical difficulty, and input
price, as well as social conflict. A follow-up of a subset of those
projects found that nontechnical risks accounted for nearly one-
half of the total risks faced by these companies, and that risks
related to company relationships with other social actors con-
stituted the single largest category (10). A separate empirical
study of 19 publicly traded junior gold-mining companies
found two-thirds of the market capitalization of these firms
was a function of the firm’s stakeholder engagement practices,
whereas only one-third was a function of the value of gold in
the ground (11).
In its analysis of socio-ecological systems (SESs), the sustain-
ability science literature has said little about the large-scale
private sector as an important actor within, and regulator of, SES
behavior. A review of the 450 sustainability science articles
published in PNAS, for example, finds just 23 referring to
“corporate,” “industry,” “private sector,” or “company” in their
texts. An extensive word cloud produced by a historical review of
20,000 papers related to sustainability science (12) notes just five
terms implying a focus on the private sector (“corporate social,”
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“corporate sustainability,” “social responsibility,” “industrial
ecology,” and “supply chain”), with none of these terms invoking
core company decision making, culture, or calculations. However,
large-scale corporate actors are obviously of central importance
to the “major questions” for research in sustainability science
(13), and perhaps especially the questions: “What shapes the
long-term trends and transitions that provide the major directions
for this century?” and “What determines the adaptability, vul-
nerability, and resilience of human–environment systems?” (13).
The relevance of private sector actors is particularly clear in
the extractive industries where, given the evolution of technology
and industrial structure in these sectors, large enterprises have
become highly influential actors in SES dynamics. Dramatic
events and disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of
Mexico, make this clear. Such enterprises can also be critical
actors in slower processes of SES change, such as those mediating
the relationships among water, agriculture, livelihoods, mining,
and climate change (14, 15). Companies in the extractive in-
dustries have, to greater or lesser extent, developed policies for
sustainable development and used sustainability professionals to
respond to the changes induced by their activities on SESs. It is
therefore important to understand the drivers of company be-
havior to build adequate models of socio-ecological change.
This study addresses one potential driver of company behav-
ior: conflicts motivated by the social and environmental risks
created by, and the impacts of, corporate activities. More spe-
cifically, the study understands social conflict as a means through
which populations communicate perceptions of risk and which
generate costs for companies. The study refers to risk from the
perspective of the entity experiencing the risk (i.e., environ-
mental risks are risks to the environment; social risks are risks to
society, social groups, or individuals; and business risks are the
risks to the business). We ask about the significance of the costs
associated with community conflict to companies, how far com-
panies are prepared to respond to these costs by seeking strat-
egies to reduce the environmental and social risk that they
generate within SESs, and the conditions that can induce regu-
latory and strategic change within the corporate sector itself such
that it reduces any negative environmental and social impacts.
Although the report addresses just one dimension of large-scale
private sector activity, the purpose is to suggest the importance of
paying far more attention to corporate behavior in studies of socio-
ecological dynamics. Emerging research on large-scale land
acquisitions, or “land grabs” (16), and the implications for land-
change science (17) suggests the same need to attend to corporate
actors in sustainability science. In addressing this theme, our pri-
mary purpose is to map out, explore, and identify (rather than test)
particular relationships between large-scale business and SES dy-
namics. The intent of the research is to build SES theory in ways
that treat corporate behavior as endogenous to these systems.
Through in-depth confidential interviews with corporate fi-
nance, legal, and sustainability professionals, and empirical case
analysis, we investigate the extent to which recognition of the
costs of conflict has the potential to change the ways in which
companies address the environmental and social risks of mining
and hydrocarbon development. Case studies combined desk-
based analysis of secondary materials with key informant inter-
views to confirm or supplement the analysis. Case studies were
used to characterize the types of company–community conflicts
affecting mining projects, the point at which conflict took effect
within the project cycle, and the types of effects that conflict
appeared to have on projects. Key informant interviews were
used to address how large-scale mining and hydrocarbon com-
panies interpret these conflicts, how they respond to them, the
factors determining different types of company response, and the
extent to which calculations of the financial costs of conflict
change the ways in which companies respond.
Results
The Triggers and Impacts of Conflict. Publicly available information
about cases of prolonged or escalated company–community
conflict around mining operations were analyzed (n = 50) to
understand the issues in dispute, the manifestations of conflict,
and the project characteristics (SI Materials and Methods and
Dataset S1). The case pool was selected based on the availability
of secondary data in gray and published literature and the first-
hand field experience of the authors. A first empirical finding is
that the most common proximate issues—those that the parties
to conflict presented as the central issues in dispute—were en-
vironmental issues (Fig. 1). Pollution of, competition over, and
access to, natural resources were identified as the most frequent,
followed by the absence of opportunities for community stake-
holders to provide consent at the outset of projects, and concerns
about community health and safety. The most common un-
derlying issues—those that contributed to the state of the re-
lationship between the parties, while not necessarily precipitating
conflict—were observed to be social and economic in character.
The distribution of benefits, differences in culture and custom
between corporate and community actors, and the absence or
quality of ongoing processes for consultation and communica-
tion, were the issues present in the highest proportion of cases.
A second finding is that the feasibility and construction stages
of projects are overrepresented in the proportion of conflicts
that led to the suspension and abandonment of projects (Fig. 2).
One explanation is that these periods can represent dramatic
transitions for local communities, with major project impacts
being experienced for the first time and large influxes of—often
temporary—workers from other geographic locations. The fea-
sibility and construction phases also represent time periods when
local community and civil society organizations, if mobilized,
have the greatest opportunity to influence whether and how
projects proceed. This representation is in part because the
project is smaller in scale and therefore easier to contest (18),
but also because at later stages of the project cycle, capital has
been sunk into an area, changes become costly to retrofit, rev-
enues begin to be generated, and there are increased incentives
for companies and governments to “defend” their projects. Civil
society organizations were found to mobilize and build cam-
paigns around major government and corporate decision points,
such as final investment decisions or impact-assessment pro-
cesses. The feasibility and construction stages simultaneously
constitute mobilization points for project opponents and periods
of vulnerability for project proponents.
A third finding is that company–community conflict related to
mining tends to escalate from campaigns and procedural actions
(such as complaints or grievances lodged with governments,
companies, tribunals, or courts) through to physical protest. The
finding reveals that opportunities do commonly exist for di-
alogue to address issues before escalation. Nonetheless, a sig-
nificant proportion of our cases demonstrated escalated forms of
conflict. Half of the cases analyzed involved a project blockade
(25 of 50) (Fig. S1) and around one-third a fatality (21 of 50),
Fig. 1. Cases of mining company–community conflict: Issues in dispute (n = 50).
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damage to private property (17 of 50), or the suspension and
abandonment of the project (15 of 50).
The Factors Influencing the Translation of Social and Environmental
Risks to Business Costs. Perceived risks motivate conflict. The
translation of environmental and social risk to conflict does not
always occur, and cases reveal different factors that have pre-
cipitated this translation. These factors include the failure of
companies to respond to expressed concerns about risk, company
engineers dismissing community perceptions of risk as unfounded
and “unscientific,” the presence of organizations that heighten
awareness and perception of risk and present them in stark form,
and the failure of government to mediate these different per-
ceptions of risk in ways deemed impartial.
Risks to the environment, particularly to water quality and
quantity, are the most frequently expressed, and these have often
driven conflict that has created new costs for companies. Two
large-scale examples illustrate the point, each from Peru. Plans
in the North of Peru to open a new project known as Minas
Conga involved the destruction and transformation of four high-
altitude lagoons, two to supply water to the mine and two for
deposition of mine waste. Concerns regarding this modification
to the hydrological system became a primary mobilization point
for protests lasting several months that ultimately led to sus-
pension of the project. A second example, the Quellaveco pro-
ject in the South of Peru involves another large international
mining company, Anglo American. Several concerns about risks
to water have been expressed in this project: highland farming
populations have expressed concern that they would lose water
resources (parts of the urban community have expressed similar
concerns); and downstream, commercial agriculturalists worry
about risks to irrigation water. Populations also feared the risks
inherent in a permanent change to the course of the region’s
primary river. The social mobilization and conflicts over the
project paralyzed investment. A newly elected regional govern-
ment then facilitated dialogue among the parties. After a long
process, the company agreed to a fundamental redesign of the
project that would reduce many of these risks by seeking water
from other sources, and by committing to complete restoration
of the river course postmine. These changes increased the cost of
the project and led the company to postpone the final decision to
proceed. Although these are individual cases, the scale of the
investments involved makes them much more than isolated
“anecdotes.” These examples provide clear evidence of how
environmental and social risk can be translated through conflict
into business risks and additional costs.
The Costs of Conflict as Interpreted by Corporations. In depth
interviews (n = 45) were held with key individuals, primarily from
mining and hydrocarbon companies and in several instances at
a senior corporate level, but also from industry bodies, corporate
law firms, private and multilateral financial institutions, and re-
search institutes. A typology of company costs of conflict was
developed from the existing literature (19, 20) and expanded and
verified with our interviewees (Table S1). These interviewees
were asked to identify the costs imposed by different types of
conflict at different stages of the project cycle. They were also
asked to comment on the greatest and most frequent costs, and
the costs most often overlooked.
The most frequent costs identified by interviewees were those
arising from lost productivity as a result of delay. Multiple
interviewees reported cases of a major, world-class mining pro-
ject with capital expenditure of between US$3 and US$5 billion
suffering roughly US$20 million per week of delayed production
in net present value terms as a result of community conflict. This
figure was supported by separate analysis of publicly reported
financial data of a Latin American mine, at which a 9-mo delay
during construction in 2010 resulted in US$750 million in addi-
tional project costs (i.e., roughly US$20 million per week). One
interviewee revealed that company–community conflict in one
country cost one project US$100 million per year in stoppages; in
another case, community conflict that shut down a few power
lines caused an entire operation to halt at a cost of US$750,000
per day. A 7-d blockage of an energy project’s supply route in
a Middle Eastern country cost US$20,000 per day. Even at the
exploration stage, costs can accrue. In the case of initial mineral
exploration (early reconnaissance work), interviewees estimated
that around US$10,000 is lost for every day of delay in lost wages
and the costs of maintaining an exploration camp. For advanced
exploration involving drilling and geophysical delineation, up to
US$50,000 a day is lost when programs are forced into “stand-by”
as a result of company–community conflict.
In at least one instance, the cost of delay had been integrated
into “construction costs” in the project budget, which included
a 50% margin to cover delays arising from community conflict.
Financial services companies are also beginning to factor in the
prospect of delays in valuations of projects. In Australia, Credit
Suisse has applied a 2.9% discount on its corporate valuation of
AGL Energy (AGK) to account for the risk of regulatory ap-
proval delays following local community opposition to hydraulic
fracturing at their pla ned Gloucester coal-seam gas project
(21). An economy wide valuation of “environmental, social and
governance risks” across the Australian Stock Market in 2012 by
Credit Suisse identified AUS$21.4 billion in negative share-price
valuation impact. The sectors with the greatest value at risk were
min ng and hydrocarbon (AUS$8.4 billion; and an average of
2.2% impact on the target share price) (22).
Interviewees identified the greatest costs of conflict as the
opportunity costs arising from the inability to pursue projects or
opportunities for expansion or for sale. In February 2006, for
example, the developers of the Esquel project in Argentina were
forced to write down US$379 million in assets and forgo de-
velopment of US$1.33 billion in projected reserves (20). In 2003,
the owners of the Tambogrande project in Peru reported an
asset write-down of US$59.3 million following the abandonment
of the proposed project, with reserves valued at the time at
US$253 million (23, 24). In November 2011 the owners of the
Minas Conga project, discussed above, suspended construction at
the request of the Peruvian Government, following company–
community conflict. The estimated life production of the deposit
is 15–20 million ounces of gold and 4–6 billion pounds of copper,
with Newmont the majority owner (51.35%) reporting capital
expenditure of US$1.455 billion between 2010 and 2012 (25).
Minority partner (43.65%) Compañía de Minas Buenaventura
reported capital expenditure of US$498 million on Minas Conga
in 2012 (26). In 2014, Anglo American confirmed that the need to
redesign its Quellaveco project in the face of conflict in Southern
Peru had increased the estimated cost of the project from US$3.3
billion to US$5 billion (27).
In the State of Orissa, India, the Lanjigarh bauxite mining
project was abandoned following prolonged protests over In-
digenous rights, land access, and environmental issues (28). The
Fig. 2. Cases of mining company–community conflict: Operating stage (n = 50).
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proposed 3 million ton per annum project was owned by a sub-
sidiary of Vedanta Resources with the ore to service Vedanta’s US
$1.0 billion Lanjigarh refinery (29). In 2010, the Government of
India revoked environmental permits for the project in response to
the community mobilization, precipitating share-price falls for
Vedanta of around 10% (30). In 2013, the Indian Supreme Court
ruled that the project could only proceed should the village
councils in the project area indicate their support. All 12 councils
rejected the proposal. The refinery has faced temporary shutdowns
and has needed to source ore from other locations. The US$1.5
billion planned expansion of the refinery was also abandoned (29).
The costs cited by interviewees as the most often overlooked
were those resulting from the additional staff time needed, es-
pecially at the senior management level, when conflicts arise or
escalate. For one company, the working assumption is that 5% of
an asset manager’s time should be spent managing stakeholder-
related risk; yet, for one of its subsidiaries in an African country,
it is in fact 10–15%, and in one Asia-Pacific country the figure is
as high as 35–50%. In other cases, senior management estimated
that assets worth 10% or less of the company’s income were
demanding more than 80% of senior management time, in-
cluding, in one case, the CEO’s. Interviewees understood the
increased demands on personnel time resulting from company–
community conflict as opportunity costs, where disproportionate
time was expended that could be better used in other locations.
Although not an issue raised by our interviewees, higher mana-
gerial costs associated with social conflict could potentially,
however, be offset by higher profitability and lower operational
costs (e.g., labor) in such locations.
Is Quantification a Useful Language? Interviewees broadly expressed
the opinion that quantification of costs related to conflict increases
the extent to which senior management and the financial team will
consider changing corporate behavior and project design. The
interviewees confirmed that stakeholder-related business risks
are generally not aggregated across all operations. A number of
interviewees stated that improved understanding of the costs of
conflict is essential to better communicate the value of the pro-
fessional functions that are responsible for community relation-
ships and environmental performance. Several interviewees, from
different departments within mining and hydrocarbon companies,
said that staff responsible for community relationships should
learn the “language of costs” to better present a business case for
early consideration of socio-environmental issues in project design
and management. The ability to converse in technica and social-
science languages was also identified as important for employees
in technical, as well as environmental, community relations and
management roles (see also ref. 8).
One company had undertaken a comprehensive internal re-
view over a 2-mo period to better understand their exposure to
nontechnical risks (which included risks arising from conflict
with local community, delays in permitting, and local, regional,
and national political issues). A corporate-level team examined
one-dozen projects, including those at both the pre- and post-
financial investment decision stage. They asked project managers
to identify the costs of delay and other capital expenditure impacts,
based on existing timelines and budgets, and then reviewed the
information. The results were scaled for a number of the com-
pany’s top projects based on cash flow models. More than US$6
billion in costs were attributed to nontechnical risks over a 2-y
period, representing a double-digit percentage of the company’s
annual operating profits. Even so, the review did not take into
account opportunity costs or staff time. The company used
this data to attract Board-level attention to the issue. Occurring
at the same time as an internal restructuring process, the re-
view led to greater support for the professionals responsible for
community relations.
In contrast to the argument favoring quantification of costs,
interviewees stressed the importance of avoiding a cost/benefit
approach to managing stakeholder-related business risk. They
saw a clear need to distinguish between (i) strategies that combine
assessment of costs, internalization of the lessons of the past, and
making a business case that is linked to values and ethics; and (ii)
strategies only using the language of costs as a motivator of man-
agement efforts to change corporate behavior.
Conflict and the Regulation of Company Behavior. There was vari-
ation among corporate approaches to conflict avoidance and
resolution. Several interviewees were strongly of the view that
the triggers for and underlying causes of company–community
conflict, and its costs, are predictable, and that approaches,
procedures, and standards are available to companies to avoid
conflict and develop constructive relationships with community
actors. Examples of practices cited by interviewees include: (i)
meaningful engagement, consultation, and consent processes
with affected communities; (ii) processes for keeping track of
and responding to complaints, grievances, and company com-
mitments; (iii) root cause analysis to understand conflicts and
delve beyond the presenting issues, which can mask other issues
of significance to the parties to conflict; and (iv) processes for
identifying and responding to the risks and impacts of projects,
such as environmental and social impact assessment. Two of the
companies interviewed were in the process of instituting stan-
dardized procedures for tracking complaints and social incidents
throughout all of their operations, aimed at addressing issues
before they escalate.
Discussion: Factors Influencing the Translation of Risks to
Costs to Changes in Company Behavior
Boundary Actors and Corporate Behavior in SESs.Our results indicate
that knowledge of the costs of company–community conflict, and
skills in quantification, can support sustainability professionals
within companies (both those that are environment- and com-
munity-focused) develop a business case for environmental and
social risk management, and can provide a strengthened basis
from which to influence corporate decision-making. Interviewees
revealed a range of corporate behaviors. Some companies already
had procedures for integrating stakeholder-related concerns into
corporate decision making; others do not adequately consider
these issues (according to those inside the company); and some see
stakeholder-related concerns as optional “add-ons” to broader
regulatory processes for operating projects (e.g., health and safety
risk management).
The processes associated with translating the cost of conflict
into a pragmatic business case that would change corporate
strategy are not straightforward. Translation requires individuals
within organizations who can work across functional, organiza-
tional, and conceptual boundaries (31), and who can work in
more than one “language” and interpret how social and envi-
ronmental risk is translating into costs for business. The need for
internal “translators” suggests that corporate decision-makers do
not currently have the necessary models to internalize external-
ities and translate social risk inward. Those people and processes
bridging the divide between financial quantification and social
conflict represent the boundary phenomena (32–34) that will
enable alternative conceptions of risk in the extractive industries.
The Role of Corporate Culture and Policy. Such agents and processes
of translation do not exist accidentally: they prosper within
organizations when corporate cultures enable diverse voices,
perspectives, and ways of characterizing problems. Although
the evolution of supportive corporate cultures was not the
subject of our inquiry, research reveals that in the mining in-
dustry, boundary workers are more often constrained by cor-
porate cultures and the broader institutional environment than
they are integrated into corporate decision making (35). Where
social, ecological, technical, and financial knowledge connect
within companies, certain organizational conditions are evi-
dent. When sustainability practitioners are elevated to a posi-
tion of authority equivalent to other functions, their influence
often increases (8). Cross-functional internal decision-making
forums, such as committees with membership across organizational
4 of 6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1405135111 Franks et al.
PNAS proof
Embargoed  
until 3PM ET Monday 
publication weekof 
units that are responsible for addressing community grievances,
provide opportunities for diverse internal perspectives to be heard
and acted upon.
In some corporate cultures, sustainability practitioners are
involved in key decisions from the outset of operations, when
there is greatest potential to avert or avoid conflict. In these
instances, the potential costs of company–community conflict are
integrated into early engagement and planning. In other instan-
ces, sustainability professionals are included only when conflict
has erupted, or a crisis has escalated. Sustainability professionals
report that they are more able to calculate costs of conflict and
secure immediate resources in a crisis scenario. They also report
that operations tend to suffer from what researchers have called
“postcrisis recognition regression,” where the effectiveness of
sustainability professionals as boundary agents is temporary, and
occurs only for the duration of the crisis (35).
Whether operating under crisis conditions or in a stable op-
erating environment, new calculative processes for costing con-
flict may not induce corporate responses that reduce social and
environmental risks. It may be the case, for example, that a cor-
porate culture supports boundary spanners to account for the
cost of conflict, but not to catalyze change. Outcomes may be
limited to improved accounting, where companies become adept
at “building in” the cost of conflict into business models, rather
than mobilizing resources to understand conflict dynamics and
address root causes. Moreover, the responsiveness of companies
may vary depending on the commodity price cycle and the avail-
ability of resources to devote to the sustainability and community
relations functions of the business. The perverse effects of “costing
conflict” in organizations that have not embedded sustainability as
a value within corporate culture may not achieve improved sus-
tainability outcomes. Nonetheless, calculating the cost of conflict
does offer sustainability professionals a powerful lever to exercise
influence within companies.
The Role of Government Regulation. Variation in the approaches
adopted by different companies highlights the importance of
sound policy and regulation that addresses the full spectrum of
sustainable development issues. Our findings indicate that a pol-
icy environment that encourages effective predictive assessment
and management of environmental and social impacts, greater
community involvement in dialogue and decision making during
the early stages of projects (including addressing community held
expectations for consent); the formalization of such dialogue into
agreements between companies and their employees, Indigenous
peoples, and communities; and the implementation of conflict
resolution and grievance handling approaches, is particularly
important in ensuring that environmental and social risks are
managed and conflict is regulated in constructive ways.
Some governments have recently strengthened the environ-
mental and social requirements of companies in extractive in-
dustries. Of particular note is the approach being taken by the
Superintendence of Banks, Insurers and Private Pension Funds
(SBS) in Peru to create incentives for better management of social
conflict by companies, particularly in the mining, energy, and
forestry sectors (36). Social conflict, resulting in part from local
communities’ concerns about the impacts such projects may have
on their livelihoods, welfare, and human rights, is seen as having
implications for the credit risk of individual Peruvian banks, the
stability of the Peruvian financial system, and the reputation of
Peru as an investment location. The SBS is considering how reg-
ulatory measures directed at the banking sector might encourage
improved corporate policies, processes, and practices for en-
gagement and consultation with local communities. This process
includes consideration of how to evaluate the quality of company–
community relationships, and the processes that support them.
Also in Peru, as well as in other jurisdictions—notably parts of
Australia and Canada—administrations have sought to reduce
so-called “green-tape” to accelerate government approval pro-
cesses and decrease business costs (37). Our findings suggest that
any reduction of appropriate oversight of social and environmental
performance has the potential to lead to substantial costs for the
industry in the medium- to long-term through heightened risk of
company–community conflict.
Timing in the Project Cycle.When conflict occurs within the project
cycle it has a significant influence on how companies respond to
it. Conflict early in the cycle is more likely to lead companies to
withdraw from an investment (which may imply reduced social
and environmental impact, or may also mean the transfer of
impacts to another location) and to consider fundamental re-
design of the project. When conflict occurs later in the project
cycle, companies are more likely to adapt the design or add on
social responsibility activities, the latter of which provides im-
pact compensation rather than impact reduction.
Conflict as a Regulator of Industrializing SESs. In any large-scale
industrial development that might challenge the sustainability of
SESs, there are essentially two pathways for risk quantification
that are often decoupled from each other by corporate decision-
makers (Fig. 3). Pathway A in Fig. 3 reflects the business risk that
is often calculated by for-profit entities and is a reflection of their
economic and financial interests. Pathway B reflects the social
risk, which is borne by a community that is subject to such large-
scale development and may not be directly incorporated by
pathway A. Social conflict is often a result of this disconnect and
is reflective of socio-ecological stresses borne by the community.
Although social conflict and the calculation of business risk
can each regulate corporate behavior and thus the ways in which
companies intervene in SESs, it has been the latter behavior that
has typically been assumed to be the most important source of
regulation. Our results reveal, however, that companies are in-
creasingly willing to reduce social and environmental risks that
are expressed through social conflict once they understand the
financial implications and the connection to business risk. This
connecti n is particularly the case when cost arguments are di-
rectly linked to corporate citizenship and values. Company be-
havior can also be regulated by more general societal norms,
what we have termed “behavioral regulation.” Behavioral regu-
lation is often expressed through culture (pathway C in Fig. 3)
and internationally agreed values, principles, and standards (e.g.,
ref. 38), or as government regulation (pathway D in Fig. 3).
Existing literature (39) does suggest, however, that government
regulations frequently fail, at the very least when environmental
agencies are charged with enforcement. Government regulation
as well as global codes of conduct remain important, particularly
so in circumstances where constructive conflict and the public
expression of risk and grievance are not possible because of a
Fig. 3. Conflict as a regulator of industrializing SESs.
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range of reasons from social protocols, or repression of social
movements in authoritarian states. The convergence of behav-
ioral regulation through cultural and political means and risk
management through cost metrics is likely to achieve more
sustainable outcomes for ecological systems impacted by re-
source extraction projects.
Conclusions
The transformations driven by the activities of large-scale mining
and hydrocarbon operations are on such a scale that the conflicts
discussed in this report exceed disputes over access to and con-
trol of resources. Instead, they are conflicts over threats to—as
well as modes of enhancing—broader SES sustainability. Indeed,
citizen and corporate actors involved in these processes increasingly
frame them as challenges of sustainability: not only because such
a framing may improve either the resonance of their discourse of
protest or their corporate image, but also because they increasingly
view the issues at stake as being of critical importance to their own
survival (as communities and as corporations).
Long-term trends in SESs will depend considerably on the extent
to which the private sector internalizes the environmental and so-
cial consequences of development into business decision making.
Social conflict is one medium whereby environmental and social
risks can translate into costs for businesses. An improved un-
derstanding of the relationship between environmental and social
risk and project success has the potential to enhance the sustain-
ability outcomes of large-scale development in the extractive
industries. Sustainability science will benefit from greater un-
derstanding of the relative burdens of risks on companies and
communities. To date, there has been minimal focus on how the
risks borne by communities in the form of social risk interface
with business risk, and associated costs and financial liabilities.
We have therefore focused on how large-scale corporate actors
intervene in SESs, how they monitor these interventions, how
they learn from and with other populations living within these
systems, and how their internal organizational forms and cultures
affect such learning processes.
Materials and Methods
Our findings are derived from three primary data sources: in depth, confi-
dential interviews (n = 45); case analysis of company-community conflict
around mining operations (n = 50); and a national key informant survey (n =
97) and detailed field study (n =39) of mining company and government
responses to conflict in Peru. Detailed explanation of methods is available in
SI Materials and Methods. See Figs. S2–S4 for cases by geographic location,
mining company type, and primary commodity.
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